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WATER AND SANITATION FOR ALL: PARTNERSHIPS AND INNOVATIONS
SOUTH AFRICA, LIKE many countries, is striving to add a
socio-economic dimension to the traditional infrastruc-
ture project targets of quality, cost and speed of construc-
tion. This means a re-examination of the construction
process, to determine ways in which projects can generate
more employment and make more effective use of local
resources. The concept of self-help is attractive, in princi-
ple, as a way of mobilising the local community, but is
seldom as cheap or attractive in practice as it might appear
in theory. Simple projects can be built by amateurs, but
self-help groups may not make optimum use of scarce
materials and they may put themselves and others at risk
by building badly. Thus there is much to be said for
entrusting the construction (and maintenance) process to
those whose business it is, and whose skills can gradually
develop as their experience grows.
Ideally the beneficiaries of this process of entrustment
should be small firms rather than large, because they can
potentially offer the best value for money to clients on
small, disparate and often geographically dispersed
schemes.1 Small firms are also more likely to generate local
employment, make effective use of local materials and
provide a continuing resource for maintenance and gradual
upgrading.
Where there is an ample supply of efficient and cost-
effective local contractors, the client can commit the con-
struction work to them with confidence that quality, time
and cost targets will be met, while useful local employment
will be generated and thereby stimulate economic develop-
ment in the local community. However, in the absence of
a well directed and properly resourced programme of
enabling inputs, emerging contractors may not survive to
reach a stage of self-sufficiency, with the skills and finan-
cial and other resources that they need in order to provide
a responsive service to their clients.
This paper examines the role of the construction indus-
try in the implementation of infrastructure projects, and
suggests ways in which local enterprises can be enabled to
perform more effectively through technical and manage-
ment training and other selective assistance. It is a difficult
industry to understand, due partly to the institutional
framework which governs it. Some of the features that
characterise construction are the following; the responsi-
bility for design is totally separated from the responsibility
for production, the place of work constantly changes and
is subject to interference from the weather, the work force
comprises a large number of diverse specialised trades and
employment is often casual in nature.
The industry is in general poorly documented and statis-
tics relating to it are often unreliable, but there can be no
doubt that it is very significant in virtually all developing
countries both in economic and employment terms. In our
book Foundations for change2, Geoff Edmonds and I
estimated that it typically consumes 50-70 per cent of
public investment, contributes up to 5-10 per cent of gross
domestic product (GDP), and provides employment to a
comparable proportion of the labour force. A more de-
tailed study of 11 developing countries by UNCHS (Habi-
tat)3 suggested that its share of gross fixed capital forma-
tion is in the range of 35-83 per cent (with an unweighted
average of 56.5 per cent), that value added by the construc-
tion industry (excluding building materials and transpor-
tation) is typically in the range of 3-8 per cent and employ-
ment is in the range of 2-9 per cent (with a heavy clustering
around 4-5 per cent).
Some basic definitions will help to guide us through the
uncertainties. In her classic text Economic theory and the
construction industry4, Patricia Hillebrandt defined con-
struction as a single industry whose total product is
durable buildings and works.
The contracting part of the industry undertakes to
organise, move and assemble the various materials and
component parts so that they form a composite whole of
a building or other work. The product which the contract-
ing industry is providing is basically the service of moving
the earth and material, of assembling and managing the
whole process. Individual contractors may seek to enhance
their influence over their business environment through
backward linkages (manufacturing and/or distributing
building materials) or forward linkages (real estate devel-
opment in one form or another).
Mixing building with speculative housing develop-
ment is a common practice in industrialised countries,
but is rarer in developing countries in view of difficul-
ties in mobilising additional working capital coupled
with already limited management capacity. This situa-
tion may change, with the growing emphasis on private
sector shelter provision together with widespread per-
ception of real estate as a safe haven for savings during
periods of inflation and currency instability. However,
for the immediate future it is reasonable to adopt
Hillebrandt’s definition for the contracting part of the
industry, and focus on measures to increase its effec-
tiveness in carrying out the process of organisation,
moving and assembly in accordance with quality, time
and cost targets.
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This definition helps to emphasise the importance of
developing a judicious combination of technical and man-
agement skills if building and associated infrastructure
work is to be carried out satisfactorily. Good managers are
hard to find, and management development requires a
more subtle and sophisticated approach than a series of
lectures on book-keeping and cash flow (although these
may be useful components of a practical management
development programme). In Small business in the third
world5 Malcolm Harper noted that the performance of
many enterprises, of all sizes, suggests that the scarcity of
competent managers is a more serious constraint on eco-
nomic development than the shortage of finance. Small
enterprises are often preferred because they use less capital
which is a scarce resource; it may be even more important
to promote them because they use less management, which
is even more scarce.
In most cases, the analysis of constraints facing small
contractors will itself suggest how, as a group, they might
be assisted. Foundations for change6 argued that the poli-
cies and regulations affecting national construction indus-
tries should be recast to provide a reasonable environment
in which domestic contractors can operate. Where they
perform inadequately, the usual response of government
(which, after all, is in the regulatory business!) is to
introduce still tighter controls in order to induce these
recalcitrants to mend their ways. Although this may be
seen as a ‘natural’ response, it is evident that the tightening
of controls from outside reduces the authority and ac-
countability of the management of the enterprise and
endangers its viability: thus the effect of imposing addi-
tional controls may be quite the opposite of what was
intended. This is not to say that the loosening of controls
will automatically increase efficiency. However, the fewer
the constraints which are imposed, the more possible it
becomes to assess the competence with which manage-
ment exercises its discretion. Incompetent or frivolous
contractors can then be identified and removed from
tender lists, thereby encouraging the survival of the fittest.
Tight constraints, on the other hand, provide a permanent
and justifiable alibi for inefficiency and make it difficult to
distinguish the competent from the incompetent.
If the strategy of emancipating, rather than shackling,
the domestic contractor is accepted, there will be at least a
prospect of engineering an equitable and balanced institu-
tional framework, in which all members of the construc-
tion team (not just the designers and administrators) have
a chance to contribute to a more effective industrial effort.
One example is the question of how much risk should be
borne by the client and how much should be borne by the
contractor. Large firms in industrialised countries have
sufficient financial resources “to take the rough with the
smooth”, but excessive risk transference for small domes-
tic contractors in developing countries may not really be in
the national interest.
Thus there is a case for preparing simplified and more
equitable contracts to suit projects that are likely to be
executed by small contractors. For example, in the field of
road maintenance contracts, which share the characteris-
tics of being generally of medium or small size, scattered
geographically, with a scarcity of resources for prepara-
tion and supervision, the World Bank has suggested that
the adoption of standard documents and simplified proce-
dures can enhance the efficiency of highway authorities.7
However, it is important to take care in establishing forms
of contract that provide a positive incentive to the contrac-
tor. (See box for lessons from World Bank experience in
the establishment of simplified road maintenance con-
tracts).
In shelter projects there is also considerable scope for
experimentation with simpler forms of contract documen-
tation. More than twenty years ago a World Bank team8
concluded that: the single most important means of pro-
moting the development of the domestic construction
industry is through the adoption of efficient and equitable
contracting systems and procedures. The contractor should
have full responsibility for the labour, materials, work-
manship, programming, management and all logistics of
the construction operations. He or she should be paid
promptly on portions of work done and measured accord-
ing to specifications and terms of contract and should have
access to mechanisms which allow prompt and fair settle-
ment of disputes. In short, the contractor should be a full
Some lessons from World Bank experience
1. The cost-plus-fee contract has been used in Brazil for implementing
road maintenance by contract. It was thought at the time that
contractors would not accept any other type of contract because
they were not familiar with the risks involved in road maintenance. As
always with cost-plus, there was an incentive to inflate inputs and
costs, so as to inflate profit. It took 15 years to shift to contracts
based on unit prices, once it was realised that cost plus contracts
are not much more efficient than direct labour (force account).
2. Grass cutting can easily be checked when the works are completed,
but the contract must specify the number of cuts per year and the
width of cut. Otherwise cuts will be rare and narrow if paid by lump
sum or frequent and broad if paid per square metre (examples from
Malaysia and Nigeria).
3. In Chile there are two unit prices per square metre for patching pot
holes, one for pavement repairs and one for base and pavement
repairs. The bidding documents contain an estimate of the number
of pot holes and the area of affected surface, as a basis for the
contractor to calculate average unit prices.
4. In Pakistan, the highway authority has a budget for emergency
operations, and every year they select three contractors in each zone
for these works. A standard format for the bill of quantities is
prepared in advance. When an emergency occurs, quantities of
itemised works are estimated by the highway engineer, and bids are
sought from three contractors with immediate award and issuance of
the order to proceed. Actual quantities are measured for payment.
5. Pot hole patching is contracted out on a lump sum basis in the
Seychelles, so as to give contractors an incentive to intervene early
and patch emerging holes before they grow bigger.
6. Three year contracts for maintenance attached to contracts for
rehabilitation are being prepared in Zaire. Maintenance is easier to
contract out once the road has been put back in good shape, and
the continuing responsibility for maintenance is a positive incentive to
the rehabilitation contractor.
Source: Lantran, J-M Contracts for road maintenance works agreements
for works by direct labor. World Bank, Washington, 1991.
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partner in the contract with clearly defined obligations,
responsibilities and rights. Unless this basic requirement is
met, efforts to develop a domestic industry as defined in
this paper will not be effective.
This statement was reiterated in a later World Bank
study in 19889 which noted that for contractors in develop-
ing countries “it is the adverse environment that is perpetu-
ating their underdevelopment”, citing the tendency for
governments to prepare one-sided contract documents
making the contractors responsible for all events, pushing
contractors to reduce their prices even after competitive
bids are received, masking their own inefficiencies by
blaming the contractors for every setback, delaying pay-
ments with impunity and failing to compensate contrac-
tors for adverse physical conditions and other acts of
government such as changes in exchange rates, interest
structure and import and taxation policies. The study
emphasised the “fundamental requirements” that contrac-
tors need protection against unfair treatment throughout
the construction cycle including efficient prequalification
procedures, equitable contract documents, fair criteria for
the award of contracts, equitable administration of con-
tracts and effective procedures for settling disputes.
Foundations for change10 discussed the possibility of
establishing intermediary Contractor Development Agen-
cies (CDAs) to modify the framework that governs the
industry in a way that will deliberately encourage the
emergence of capable and well motivated domestic con-
struction businesses. We felt that the CDA should have
sufficient autonomy to be in a position to gain the trust of
both contractors and their ultimate clients (who are and
are likely predominantly to remain in the public sector),
and suggested that there are five main ways in which such
an agency can assist contractors:
• negotiating a smooth flow of work;
• financial assistance;
• acquisition of plant and materials;
• training and enterprise development;
• fostering contractors’ associations to enable them to
negotiate on their own behalf.
The World Bank and other influential donors/financing
agencies have been attracted to channelling funds through
autonomous agencies in recent years. Their primary goal
has probably been to improve the prospects of efficient and
effective project execution, but the creation of employment
and construction industry development have been impor-
tant associated goals. The model for these agencies is the
AGETIP (Agence d’exécution des travaux d’intérêt public
contre le sous-emploi), which work largely with and
through the private sector including preparation of bid-
ding documents and inspection in the broad sense of
“owner’s delegate” (in French “mission de maitrise
d’ouvrage deleguée”).11 The AGETIP in Sénégal arose in
1989 in the wake of concerns related to the social effects
of the structural adjustment programme, and it was estab-
lished as a not-for-profit non-governmental organisation
with the following objectives:12
• to create employment, particularly in urban areas;
• to provide vocational training, to improve the opera-
tional efficiency of the local construction industry and
the effectiveness of public institutions;
• to demonstrate the scope for increased application of
employment-intensive construction technologies, and
• to execute public works that are worthwhile in both
economic and social terms.
The AGETIP approach depends for its success on by-
passing cumbersome and bureaucratic government proce-
dures, paying competitive salaries to a comparatively
small number of well motivated national staff of high
calibre and making extensive use of the private sector. The
sustainability of the approach is yet to be proved, and there
is a danger that the objectives of the organisation may
become excessively diffuse and its independence may be
compromised (essentially the problems which eventually
overcame the now defunct Kenya National Construction
Corporation, which had enjoyed considerable success in
the 1960s and 1970s). Nevertheless, it is a positive re-
sponse to the “feast and famine” nature of demand for
construction which is a distinct constraint on poorly
capitalised small enterprises, and it can also operate effi-
cient payment procedures so that contractors can plan
their work more effectively and gain a reputation for
responsible financial management (see box below).
The measures for prompt settlement of certified pay-
ment due to contractors constitute a major benefit, and
help to overcome the widespread demand by contractors
for improved access to finance for short term working
capital needs as well as longer term financing of physical
assets. Direct financing of contractors is a risky business
for agencies lacking real banking experience, and careful
thought must be given to setting appropriate interest rates
and collateral requirements.
Physical resource constraints could be tackled by oper-
ating a pool of plant for hire or by arranging for bulk
purchase of key materials. A World Bank informal policy
paper13 advocated the establishment of plant pools in the
context of the privatization of road construction and
maintenance, providing they have “the capacity of a pri-
vate firm operating in a competitive environment.” In
practice this is often difficult to achieve in the absence of
effective competition, and the pool may be tempted to
The association AGETIP, in Senegal, has been given a mission of owners
delegate for a program of small- and medium size labour-based public
works and services. AGETIP contracts out all engineers duties for
preparation and supervision to local consultants. Works and services are
contracted out to artisans and small- and medium-size contractors.
AGETIP carries out the whole management of the project, including
inspection tasks. In 1990 AGETIP managed a program of about 130
contracts for works (average value US$ 80,000) and the same number
of contracts for consulting services. Standard and computer aided
procedures allow AGETIP to pay for works and services within a week.
Source: Lantran, J-M, op cit.
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exploit its monopoly position so that contractors are kept
in a state of subservience. In principle it seems better for
contractors to own their own equipment, but for a market
to develop between them which allows for hire of specialist
equipment surplus to immediate requirements (perhaps
under the auspices of the local contractors’ association.
Nevertheless it must be recognised that equipment is an
expensive item in infrastructure contracting (although less
so in building), even for labour-intensive contractors.
Where funds are used to finance the import of foreign
equipment and the local currency is subject to frequent
devaluation, contractors who are required to bear the
exchange risk may find themselves paying very high effec-
tive interest rates. On the other hand, if the contractors are
excused the exchange rate risk the scheme may attract
speculators rather than serious contractors.
AGETIP-type agencies have been replicated in a number
of countries (notably Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauretania
and Niger), and are likely to continue to demonstrate
success while they benefit from a significant flow of
external resources. It is, however, difficult for a single
organisation to combine development activities with project
execution imperatives and conflicting pressures may
emerge. If the objective is to enable firms to become self-
reliant, it may be better to concentrate on training, enter-
prise development and fostering a corporate approach
among the contractors themselves. These were the priori-
ties mentioned by Kirmani and Blaxall in their 1988 World
Bank Discussion Paper 14, where they proposed the follow-
ing areas for action in World Bank-financed projects:
• improving contracting and contract administration
policies and practices;
• improving the business environment of the industry;
• improving the efficiency of contractors;
• developing the institutions of the construction indus-
try; and
• research and development related to the construction
industry.
Kirmani and Blaxall envisaged the establishment of an
enabling, rather than an executive, institution entitled the
Construction Industry Development Board which should
be small, with a multi-disciplinary staff and an advisory
board comprising representatives of contractors’ associa-
tions, the consulting profession, chambers of commerce
and concerned government ministries. Its main responsi-
bilities would be monitoring and evaluating the activities
of the industry, improving the effectiveness of policies and
strategies, conducting case studies and monitoring per-
formance indicators (value added, cost effectiveness, qual-
ity of work and project completion time).
The aim should be to devise modest, enabling interven-
tions which will help the local contractors to help them-
selves. In developing countries most small contractors are
practical people, who may have experienced trade or
vocational training but have rarely been introduced to
basic management and business training in a form that is
relevant to their practical needs. The result is that their
businesses are fragile and frequently fail, resulting in a loss
of scarce national resources and embarrassment for their
clients. The construction industry development problem is
thus predominantly a management development problem,
since most of the difficulties which beset the industry could
be overcome if managers within it could engender greater
trust in their skills among clients and resource providers.
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